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Abstract:  With  the  goal  of  freeing  the  world  from  poverty,  some  Western 
authorities have consistently insisted on promoting democracy in totalitarian states in 
the past decades. Seeing that democratic political system are stably established more 
and  more  in  many  countries,  an  opportunity  arises  to  determine  the  effects  of 
democracy  on  economic  development.  Taking  advantage  of  this  fact,  this  paper 
attempts to explore whether or not democracy contributes largely to prosperity of a 
nation. The conclusion is that, whereas democracy acts as a catalyst that influences 
prosperity in many already well-to-do nations, democracy per se is not significantly 
beneficial  to  low  initial  income  countries.  Another  interesting  point  found  in  this 
study is that the Western colonialism tends to be one of the most significant factors in 
explaining poor economic development in many regions of the world today.  
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1. Introduction and Literature Reviews 
 
 
A form of market economy combined with a democratic political system has 
been adopted by most developed countries. It has been believed that this combination 
of economic and political systems is the perfect equation for the prosperity of nations. 
Therefore, with the objective of obtaining wealth coupled with the fact that some 
Western  authorities  have  been  consistently  insisting  on  fostering  democratic 
movements  in  totalitarian  states,  many  countries  changed  their  dictatorships  into 
stable democracies beginning in the late 1980s. Here, democracy is called ‘stable’ in 
the sense that the democratic political system has been retained, without falling back 
to authoritarianism, since the emergence of democracy up to 2005 for at least ten 
years.  
Regarding  the  issue  of  whether  or  not  democracy  indeed  is  superior  to 
dictatorship in causing the prosperity of a nation, there are two main theories favored 
among  scholars.  The  first  argument  is  that  democracy  will  bring  prosperity  and 
growth  into  a  nation.  In  this  respect,  it is  widely  believed  that  in  order  to  obtain 
economic  prosperity  from  a  market  economy,  private  property  is  necessary.  As  a 
result, to effectively secure private domain, the government must act under the rule of 
law. As pointed out by McMillan (1994), when states can legally expropriate the land 
from the subjects, regardless of reasons, an insecure right over property discourages 
people  from  investing  in  such  assets,  which,  in  turn,  undermines  the  prospect  of 
growth in a nation. Moreover, Stiglitz (2002) argues that active participation of people 
in policy-making contributes to the sustainability of economic development in the 
long  run.  Hence,  by  referring  to  this  argument,  the  phenomenon  of  waves  of 
democratization will finally lead to the prosperity of nations. 
A  second  theory  contradicts  that  approach  by  arguing  that  authoritarian 
regimes have an advantage in that they do not largely depend on interest groups and 
thus can select policies without much pressure. Therefore, a country can benefit from 
its highly-controlled government and economic development can continue in line with 
the authoritarian regime. In fact, according to Barro (1996), there are advantages to 
dictatorships  for  the  economic  development  of  a  nation.  Specifically,  because  a 
dictator has ultimate control over the economic system within his nation, it is possible 
to control rent-seeking as well as other redistribution pressures. In other words, an  
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autocrat is capable of shutting down or ignoring redistributory demands of interest 
groups, which is not characteristic of a democracy. 
Thus, not surprisingly, the empirical work on economic advancement as the 
result of democracy is still inconclusive. For example, the reviews of Przeworski and 
Limongi (1993)
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 and Barro (1996) assert that democracy has an economically small 
and statistically insignificant effect on economic growth. In line with this, by using 
graphical analysis showing different countries’ shifts between authoritarianism and 
democracy and data about average gross domestic product per capita through time, 
Goldstone (2009) suggests that there is no direct correlation between democracy and 
economic development. According to Goldstone (2008)
3, “These graphs show some 
countries  that  move  from  authoritarian  to  democratic  frequently,  but  have  no  real 
economic change,” citing Peru and Chile as examples. “Another population consists 
of countries that have been stably democratic, that have just gotten richer.” It can be 
inferred from Goldstone (2009) that whereas there is a group of countries that benefit 
from democracy, another group seems unlikely to obtain economic prosperity through 
democracy. However, Feng (2003) concludes that democracy significantly leads to 
economic  growth.  Likewise,  Papaioannou  and  Siourounis  (2008)  report  positive 
correlations between democracy and long-run growth. 
Therefore, as democratic political systems are established in more and more 
countries, an opportunity arises to determine the effects of democracy on economic 
development. If there are positive advances toward prosperity in the future, one would 
be  able  to  logically  and  convincingly  argue  that  democracy  does  indeed  spawn 
economic  development.  Additionally,  this  paper  is  also  going  to  explore  whether 
democracy  is  actually  the  determinant  of  the  prosperity  of  those  nations  that 
comparatively started off with low initial income. The argument is that it is likely that 
democracy  sustains  the  wealth  of  rich  nations  but  whether  or  not  the  poor  can 
eventually be as rich as their wealthy peers through democracy is still questionable. 
In the next section, some descriptive data are presented. Then, the econometric 
specification of the model as well as the features of the data used in the regression 
analysis is discussed in section 3. In Section 4, the main empirical results examining 
                                                 
2According to Przeworski’s literatures’ review, although most likely every one agrees with that the 
protection of property rights could foster economic growth, there is a debate on whether democracies or 
dictatorships better secure citizens’ property rights (Przeworski, 1993). 
3 http://thedartmouth.com/2008/11/18/news/goldstone/  
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the effect of democracy on growth for lower income countries are presented followed 
by the discussion in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. General Overviews of Descriptive Data 
 
Table 1 presents GDP per capita as of 1960, the year which we set here as a 
starting point, and GDP per capita as of 2004 of high income countries today that 
have always been highly democratic (Polity score always higher than 5) since 1960. 
In this study, real GDP per capita ($ in 2000 constant prices: Chain series) from Penn 
World PWT 6.2 is employed. Data are available till 2004. Countries are classified as 
high-income following the World Bank list of economies (July 2008)
4. High income 
nations with no Polity score provided e.g. Barbados and Bahamas are excluded from 
the Table. Regarding the Polity score, it is one of the most widely-cited indicators of 
democracy used by scholars and policy analysts in comparative research. It measures 
levels of democracy on an ordinal scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -
10 (strongly autocratic). The Polity score will be discussed more in the next section.  
From Table 1, we can see that almost all of the high income economies, which 
have always been democratic states, are already at relatively high levels of income 
from 1960 onwards. Except for Japan, the GDP per capita of all these high income 
countries was higher than $5,000 in 1960. The average GDP per capita growth rate 
over the period of 1960-2004 of these countries is about 2.6 percent (see the last row 
of column 3). It is important to note that although the computed average growth rates 
of these countries are not particularly high, with the high initial income levels, even at 
this level of growth prosperity can be expected in the long run. In other words, despite 
unspectacular economic growth rates, they still show the kind of sustained economic 
growth that seems likely to carry them further to be relatively high income countries 
in the future. 
 
 
                                                 
4 According to the World Bank (July 2008), economies are divided according to 2007 GNI per capita, 
calculated  using the World  Bank  Atlas  method. The groups are:  low income, $935 or less;  lower 
middle income, $936 - $3,705; upper middle income, $3,706 - $11,455; and high income, $11,456 or 
more.  
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Table 1: GDP per capita of high income economies as of 2004 which have been a sovereign 
country before 1960 and have always been democratic since 1960 onwards 
 
   GDP in 1960  GDP in 2004  Average growth 
Austria  8,444  28,158  2.80 
Belgium  8,070  25,885  2.71 
Denmark  11,438  28,447  2.12 
Finland  7,785  24,608  2.71 
France  8,531  26,168  2.60 
Germany  9,424  25,606  2.32 
Iceland  8,380  27,899  2.87 
Ireland  5,294  28,957  3.98 
Italy  7,167  23,175  2.73 
Japan  4,509  24,661  4.01 
Netherlands  10,462  26,479  2.15 
Norway  9,473  34,759  3.01 
Sweden  11,065  27,073  2.08 
Switzerland  15,253  29,276  1.53 
U.K.  10,323  26,762  2.21 
Australia  10,815  27,994  2.20 
New Zealand  12,063  22,792  1.50 
Canada  10,576  28,398  2.30 
U.S.A.  12,892  30,698  2.39 
Israel  6,750  21,230  2.73 
20 countries      2.55 
       
Source: real GDP per capita ($ in 2000 constant prices: Chain series) provided by Penn World PWT 
6.2.  Note: average growth is author’s own work using data from Penn World PWT 6.2. 
 
In contrast to developed nations, democracy does not seem to create a positive 
impact on the wealth of countries which have made transitions to democracy if they 
were relatively poor to begin with. Figure 1 shows GDP per capita of countries, which 
have made a transition from a dictatorship to stable democracy during 1960-1995. 
Because the purpose of this section is to compare countries’ economic development 
during the stable democratic era with their previous authoritarian ones as well as to 
see whether or not the initial level of income is essential for a democratic political 
system to contribute to the sustainable economic growth in a nation, in addition to the 
income level as of 1960 or as of independence, the level of GDP per capita as of the 
latest transition year before a country became stably democratic are also reported (The 
data corresponding to Figure 1 can be found in Table 2). Descriptive data concerning 
average GDP per capita growth rates during the respective eras for each country are 
also given in Table 2.   
At this point, two important remarks are worth making. First of all, note again 
that  in  this  display  democracy  is  called  ‘stable’  in  the  sense  that  the  democratic  
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political system has been retained since the latest emergence of democracy up to 2004 
for  at  least  ten  years.  Also,  the  Polity  score  averaged  over  the  period  from  the 
transition year to 2005 is higher than 5.  Here, we classify the transition year as the 
year where the Polity score jumped from a negative value to zero or positive ones. 
The numbers in parentheses represent the  year of transition to democracy in each 
country. (Note that in this section, only countries with population over 500,000 are 
taken into account. Oil-rich nations are neglected in the sample.) Secondly, although 
there may be cases where authoritarian regimes had faced struggles and had been 
replaced by democratic ones before they eventually made the latest transition to stable 
democracy,  such  attempts  to  establish  democracy  were  not  successful.  Their 
democratic  political  system  had  on  and  off  reverted  back  to  authoritarianism.  For 
simplicity, therefore, this unsmoothed period is regarded as a general authoritarian 
one since democracy could not be firmly instituted during that time. 
From Figure 1, we can see that only Taiwan, South Korea, Spain and Portugal 
have experienced a kind of sustainable economic growth since the establishment of 
democracy. In these countries, GDP per capita in 2004 is nearly double its level in the 
transition  year  (see  clustered  bar  graphs  of  these  countries  representing  GDP  per 
capita as of the respective times in Figure 1 in parallel). Moreover, their average 
economic  growth  during  the  democratic  period  is  higher  than  two  percent  which, 
similar to the countries in Table1, can already contribute to long-run prosperity given 
their relatively high level of GDP per capita as of the transition years (the average 
growth  rate  of  South  Korean,  Taiwan,  Spain  and  Portugal  during  the  democratic 
period are 5.9, 4.4, 2.1 and 2.3 percent, respectively; see column 5 of Table 2).   
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The data corresponding to Figure 2 can be found in the last column of Table 2. 
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Table 2. GDP per capita as of 1960, as of the transition year, and as of 2004 of countries that have made a transition from dictatorship to stable democracy 
during 1960-2005. 
 
   GDP in 1960  GDP in transition year  GDP in 2004 






Benin(1990)  956  1,086  1,345  0.58  1.66  1.09 
Lesotho(1993)  680  1,362  2,008  2.75  5.10  2.35 
Madagascar(1991)  1,268  937  751  -1.02  -1.34  -0.32 
Malawi(1994)  459  819  803  1.45  1.91  0.47 
Mali(1991)  797  873  1,183  0.50  2.42  1.92 
Dominican(1978)  2,080  3,362  6,903  -0.34  3.77  4.11 
El Salvador(1981)  2,991  3,770  4,751  3.39  2.69  -0.70 
Guatemala(1986)  2,494  3,476  3,805  1.50  0.79  -0.71 
Honduras(1981)  1,715  2,397  2,313  1.43  0.43  -1.01 
Mexico(1988)  3,719  6,515  8,165  1.76  -0.02  -1.78 
Nicaragua(1990)  4,428  3,908  3,417  2.21  1.31  -0.91 
Panama(1989)  2,499  5,976  8,244  -0.25  -0.80  -0.55 
Bolivia(1982)  2,431  2,896  3,006  3.20  2.32  -0.88 
Brazil(1985)  2,644  6,531  7,204  1.18  -0.03  -1.21 
Ecuador(1979)  2,396  5,025  4,515  3.60  0.97  -2.64 
Paraguay(1989)  2,510  5,175  4,716  2.86  -0.41  -3.28 
Uruguay(1986)  6,143  7,434  9,876  0.51  2.91  2.40 
Bangladesh(1991)  1,449  1,606  2,154  1.22  2.47  1.24 
South Korea(1987)  1,458  7,374  18,423  6.10  5.89  -0.21 
Mongolia(1989)  1,156  1,768  1,597  2.99  -0.96  -3.95 
Philip(1986)  2,039  3,016  3,939  1.46  1.68  0.22 
Taiwan(1992)  1,444  1,2742  20,868  7.11  4.40  -2.71 
Thailand(1991)  1,059  5,225  7,274  5.33  2.90  -2.43 
Turkey(1983)  2,250  3,788  5,978  2.30  2.34  0.04 
Argentina(1983)  7,838  9,732  10,939  0.98  0.82  -0.16 
Chile(1989)  5,086  7,013  12,677  1.05  4.34  3.28 
Spain(1976)  4,881  11,878  20,976  6.00  2.08  -3.92  
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Portugal(1975)  3,689  8,228  17,400  6.60  2.28  -4.32 
Bulgaria (1990)  5,632  8,898  8,620  6.38  -0.60  -6.98 
Hungary (1990)  5,721  10,304  13,638  3.18  1.98  -1.20 
Poland (1990)  3,973  6,289  9,704  2.62  2.99  0.37 
Romania (1990)  1,276  6,059  6,583  5.69  0.75  -4.94 
        2.64  1.78  -0.86 
             
Source: real GDP per capita ($ in 2000 constant prices: Chain series) from Penn World PWT 6.2.   
Note: average growth is author’s own work using data from Penn World PWT 6.2.  
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Nevertheless, whereas in these four countries there is a great deal of difference 
between GDP per capita as of its respective transition year represented by the dark 
purple  bar  and  GDP  per  capita  as  of  2004  represented  by  the  yellow  one,  this 
distinction does not seem to be obvious for other countries.  The interesting point is 
that Taiwan, South Korea, Spain and Portugal made transitions to democracy when 
they  were  relatively  rich  (see  clustered  dark  purple  bar  of  these  countries  in 
comparison with others.). As a result, democratic rules have stimulated or at least 
sustained economic development in these countries ever since. On the other hand, 
democracy does not seem to support economic development in either poor African 
nations or middle-income countries. All African nations which have made transitions 
to  democracy  are  still  as  poor  as  during  their  earlier  periods.  Whether  or  not  the 
political system is democratic does not make any difference in terms of wealth in 
African nations. The economic development in the middle-income group, by the same 
token, has achieved only a modest improvement.  Another important point is that 
while  South  Korea  has  achieved  a  remarkable  economic  success  following  the 
emergence of democracy, such a miracle is not apparent in other countries, whose 
GDP  per  capita  fell  in  the  same  range  as  that  of  South  Korea  in  their  respective 
transition  years.  The  examples  of  this  are  Mexico,  Brazil,  Panama,  Uruguay  and 
Argentina. Note that these countries as well as South Korea made the transition to 
democracy in the late 1980s (1986-1989). Hence, their age of democracy is pretty 
much the same. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that Taiwan, South Korea, Spain and Portugal 
were relatively as poor as other countries examined in this study at the beginning (see 
clustered  blue  bar  representing  GDP  per  capita  in  1960,  the  initial  point).  Unlike 
others,  their  economic  advancement  significantly  improved  during  their  respective 
authoritarian eras. The average GDP per capital growth rate of South Korea, Taiwan, 
Spain, and Portugal during the authoritarian periods are 6.1, 7.1, 6 and 6.6 percent, 
respectively (see Table 2). Because of the satisfactory economic development during 
the  authoritarian  eras,  these  countries  had  reached  the  levels  of  other  developed 
countries  before  they  changed  their  political  system  into  democracies.  Another 
important aspect is that the authoritarian regime in these countries was quite stable 
during their era e.g. no prior transition to democracy.   
When we take a closer look at the figures representing average growth rate 
during the authoritarian period in comparison with the democratic one displayed in  
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Table  2,  we  can  see  that,  economic  development  during  the  democratic  period  in 
generally not better than that of authoritarian one. Figure 2, which displays the figures 
in column 6 of Table 2, shows the difference between the average growth rates during 
the stable democratic period and during the previous authoritarian period (column 5 
minus column 4). From the Figure, it can be seen, that positive changes in growth can 
only be found in few countries. The t-test below shows that the mean difference in 
growth rates between the two eras is negative and significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
Paired t test 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Variable |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    auth |      32        2.64      .39         2.21         1.84       3.43 
    demo |      32        1.78      .32         1.78         1.14       2.42 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |      32         .85      .43         2.45         -.03       1.74 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     mean(diff) = mean(auth - demo)                               t =   1.9697 
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                              degrees of freedom =       31 
 
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9711         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0579          Pr(T > t) = 0.0289 
 
 
Furthermore, when considering only column 5 of Table 2, it can be seen that 
the  only  countries  which  experienced  quite  satisfactory  economic  development 
measured by average economic growth during the democratic era are Lesotho, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Chile. In these countries, the annual growth rate on average is 5.1, 
5.3, 4.4 and 4.3 percent, respectively. However, in the case of Lesotho, despite its 
quite remarkable average economic growth during the democratic period, the GDP 
per capita as of 2004 only reached about $2,000 due to its low initial level of income. 
Now let’s imagine that Lesotho can continue to grow at this rate uninterruptedly. The 
country’s GDP per capita would arrive at $23,027 in the next fifty years. While this 
figure seems impressive, when taking a closer look at the high income countries of 
today, with the U.S.A. as the example, with a mean growth rate on 2.55, the U.S.A 
would achieve GDP per capita of approximately $108,117 in 2054. As a result, it 
seems to be unlikely for Lesotho, the best case of a low initial income country in 
terms of economic growth during the democratic era, to be as rich as the U.S.A in the 
foreseeable future. For Lesotho, in order to have the same level of GDP per capita as 
that of the U.S.A in fifty years, the country must grow at least 8.2 percent annually. 
Thus, whereas it is less likely for poorer countries to grow annually at more than 6 
percent uninterruptedly, the already-rich nations are more likely to enjoy the long-run 
prosperity despite its low level of economic growth. Put differently, it is likely that  
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rich countries will never become poor but whether the poor can eventually be as rich 
as their wealthy peers through democracy is doubtful. 
When we investigate the data in more depth, we can also see that, there are a 
number of countries adopting democracy since their first establishment despite low 
incomes, while still experiencing little economic development (e.g. India, Papua New 
Guinea). Figure 3 presents clustered bar graphs of GDP per capita as of 1960 and 
GDP  per  capita  as  of  2004  of  always  democratic  as  well  as  always  authoritarian 
countries.  Figure  4  displays  the  average  GDP  per  capita  growth  rate  of  the 
corresponding countries during the 1960-2004 period. The corresponding data of both 
figures are given in Table 3. Here, countries are classified as always democratic if 
their Polity score is always higher than 5 and Przeworski’s democracy index also 
coincides.  According  to  Przeworski  (2000),  the  regime  is  classified  as 
authoritarianism  if  there  is  no  election  for  the  legislature  or  the  chief  executive 
contested  by  two  or  more  parties.  Overall,  these  two  indexes  agree.  The  only 
exception is Botswana where the Polity score is always very high, while Przeworski 
classifies this country  as always authoritarian. Concerning Botswana,  I agree with 
Przewoski that Botswana’s ruling regime should be treated as authoritarian
5. Note 
again that rich democracies of today that had in 1960 a GDP per capita higher than 
5,000 as well as oil-rich countries are excluded from this presentation, due to the fact 
that  we  want  to  see  the  economic  development  patterns  of  democracies  with  low 
initial  income.  The  data  for  always  democratic  as  well  as  always  authoritarian 
countries which gained independence in 1990s are reported separately in Table 4. In 
Figure 3 and 4, the first eight graphs show countries which are always democratic, 
including Columbia, Japan, Mauritius, Costa Rica, Papua guinea, India, Venezuela 
and Jamaica. The remaining, beginning with Malaysia and continuing until the end of 
the  Figure,  are  countries  classified  as  always  authoritarian  since  1960  or  since 
independence. In Figure 4, the red graphs shows the average GDP per capita growth 
rates of countries classified as always democratic and the blue ones are the average 
GDP  per  capita  growth  rates  of  countries  always  adopting  authoritarian  rule.
                                                 
5  Przeworski  questioned  that  Botswana’s  government  has  ruled  the  country  since  independence. 
Although there are always elections with more than two parties competing, the elections in Botswana 
may be held because the ruling regime is certain about the election outcome and it is likely to be the 
case that the oppositions will never be allowed to assume office whenever they win. Because my study 
focuses mainly on the real political power of ruling regime, I agree with Przeworski on the point that 
Botswana should be classified as authoritarianism despite its showing competitiveness of elections. 
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The data corresponding to Figure 3 can be found in Table 3. The first eight graphs (Columbia to Jamaica) show countries which are always democratic. The remaining, beginning with Malaysia until 
the end of the Figure, are countries with the authoritarian rule since 1960 or since independence. 
 






















































Note: The red graphs show the average GDP per capita average growth rates of countries classified as always democratic and the blue ones are the average GDP per capita growth rates of 
countries always adopting authoritarian rule. The data corresponding to Figure 4 can be found in the last column of Table 3. 
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Table 3: GDP per capita as of 1960 (or the year of independence) and as of 2004 of always 
democratic and always authoritarian. 
  
GDP at 1960 or 
independence  GDP at 2004 
Average GDP per capita 
growth rate 
Columbia  2,818  6,094  1.83 
Japan  4,509  24,661  4.01 
Mauritius  4,098  16,953  4.09 
Costa Rica  4,513  8,738  1.57 
Papua   2,568  4,492  2.48 
India  892  2,990  2.90 
Venezuela  6,092  7,068  0.48 
Jamaica  3,628  4,585  0.65 
Malaysia  1,800  12,133  4.60 
Singapore   4,527  29,404  5.02 
China  448  5,332  6.81 
Swaziland  2,616  9,210  3.63 
Botswana  828  9,052  6.68 
Equatorial Guinea   1,189  11,587  9.45 
Burkina  768  1,073  0.86 
Chad  1,141  883  -0.25 
Djibouti  2,173  4,325  4.87 
Egypt  1,468  4,759  2.85 
Guinea  3,072  2,932  -0.02 
Guinea-Bissau  663  583  0.61 
Ivory coast  1,334  2,019  1.12 
Liberia  1,062  342  -0.66 
Mauritania  1,119  1,430  0.71 
Morocco  1,298  4,061  2.82 
Rwanda  1,059  1,302  1.42 
Tanzania  453  912  1.74 
Togo  833  744  0.01 
Tunisia  2,103  7,922  3.88 
Zimbabwe  2,342  2,439  0.54 
Jordan  4,151  3,743  -0.01 
Cuba  2,668  6,288  2.93 
North Korea  714  1,228  3.48 
Lebanon  3,588  6,085  4.99 
Cameroon  1,947  2,618  0.92 
Seychelles  4,601  11,128  3.46 
Zaire  701  422  -1.53 
Laos  1,005  1,412  1.27 
Myanmar  453  876  2.62 
Afghanistan  1,726  581  -1.68 
Bhutan  233  934  4.55 
Cambodia  1,947  580  -1.24 
Source: real GDP per capita ($ in 2000 constant prices: Chain series) provided by Penn World PWT 
6.2; average growth is author’s own work using data from Penn World PWT 6.2. 
Note:  Always  democratic  are  presented  in  purple.  Always  authoritarian  countries  with  satisfactory 
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Table 4: GDP per capita as of the year of independence and as of 2004 of always democratic 
and always authoritarian countries which gained independence in 1990s 
 
   GDP at 1990  GDP at 2004  GDP per capita average growth rate 
Type of 
Regime 
         
Slovak  7,469  11,328  3.25  Democracy 
Estonia  9,810  13,779  1.71  Democracy 
Ukraine  7,363  6,426  -0.87  Democracy 
Latvia  6,905  10,806  4.61  Democracy 
Lithuania  7,648  12,382  4.60  Democracy 
Macedonia  5,328  5,252  -0.32  Democracy 
Czech Republic  11,854  15,096  2.12  Democracy 
Namibia  4,505  5,556  0.93  Democracy 
Russia  10,954  11,789  -0.12  Democracy 
Slovenia  13,787  20,659  2.31  Democracy 
Eritrea  568  597  1.35  Authoritarianism 
Tajikistan  2,415  1,942  -0.99  Authoritarianism 
Turkmenistan  8,685  7,342  -0.94  Authoritarianism 
Uzbekistan  4,075  3,916  -0.02  Authoritarianism 
Azerbaijan  3,305  3,667  2.34  Authoritarianism 
Kazakhstan  8,725  10,162  2.20  Authoritarianism 
Kyrgyzstan  3,484  3,463  0.47  Authoritarianism 
Source: real GDP per capita ($ in 2000 constant prices: Chain series) provided by Penn World PWT 
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From Figure 3 and 4, we can see that whereas democracy seems to support 
economic success in Japan and Mauritius, a democratic political system has fostered 
little  economic  development  in  other  always  democratic  countries,  despite  some 
improvement. Regarding always authoritarian nations, beginning with Malaysia and 
continuing until the end of the table, although most of today’s poor nations have an 
authoritarian  regime  as  the  political  system,  there  exist  some  countries  such  as 
Malaysia, Swaziland, China, Botswana and Equatorial Guinea that have had a relative 
economic success along with their authoritarian regimes both in terms of differences 
between GDP per capita as of 2004 and 1960, as well as their average GDP per capita 
growth rates.  
In conclusion, considering Table 1, Table 2 (Figure1 and Figure2) and Table 3 
(Figure3), it would not be wrong to say that democracy encourages an already-rich 
nation to get richer but has not particularly helped the poorer countries to get out of 
the poverty trap. In other words, the countries which made a transition to democracy 
at  lower  levels  of  income  tend  not  to  benefit  much  from  democracy  in  terms  of 
prosperity. (Although it could be argued that consistently high income democracies 
also made a transition at lower levels of income, their incomes at the time of transition 
were comparatively higher than other countries. Moreover, one might argue that at 
their time of transitions to democracy, their GDP per capita was relatively equal to 
those  of  Latin-American  countries  and  the  stability  of  democracy  helps  reinforce 
economic  development  in  these  consistently  high  income  democracies  of  today. 
However, I will argue in a subsequent part of the study that there is another significant 
predictor,  colonialism,  which  thwarts  Latin-American  countries’  economic 
development.) Moreover, despite some improvement in the case of middle income 
countries, they still failed to show the kind of sustained economic growth that seems 
likely to carry them to relatively high income levels in the foreseeable future.  
Thus, whether or not countries will be prosperous does not appear to depend 
on  democracy  per  se.  It  is  likely  that  rich  countries  will  never  become  poor  but 
whether the poor can eventually be as rich as their wealthy peers through democracy 
is questionable. Furthermore, it seems more likely that the low income democratic 
African nations, at best, would follow the same path as their low-income democratic 
peers, such as India.  
Given  our  discussion  on  these  descriptive  statistics,  we  turn  to  our 
econometric specification as well as the empirical evidence.  
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The dependent variable is the growth rate of annual real per capita GDP ($ in 2000 
constant prices: Chain series) provided by Penn World data PWT 6.2 in country i in 
year t. The main explanatory variable of interest is democracy. 
To test the hypothesis, the following regression equation is used. 
it T t i T t i t it u Z b Demo b b growth + + + = − − , 3 , 1 0  
where i is the country; t is the time period; T is a time lag, taken to be five years.  The 
use of lagged variables mitigates the potential endogeneity problem to some extent. Z 
is a vector of variables, such as urbanization, economic institutions, etc. that we might 
expect to affect growth; and u is an error term. DEMO is the indicator for democracy - 
competitiveness of the political regime and liberal democracy, which are provided by 
Polity  IV  and  Freedom  House,  respectively.  In  this  respect,  the  definitions  of 
democracy in the present study are rather narrow focusing on the competitiveness of 
the regime as well as the role of elections. More specifically, for the former as a 
measure  of  democracy  the  Polity  index  created  by  Gurr
6  and  his  associates  is 
employed. As mentioned before, Polity score measures levels of democracy on an 
ordinal  scale  ranging  from  +10  (strongly  democratic)  to  -10  (strongly  autocratic). 
According to Polity IV’s definition,  
Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. 
One  is  the  presence  of  institutions  and  procedures  through  which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and 
leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise  of  power  by  the  executive.  Third  is  the  guarantee  of  civil 
liberties  to  all  citizens  in  their  daily  lives  and  in  acts  of  political 
participation. 
 
To  see  if  the  findings  remain  robust  and  consistent  irrespective  of  the  specific 
measures  of  democracy  which  are  employed  for  analysis,  Freedom  House  (FH)’s 
                                                 
6 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
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index of liberal democracy, which is also broadly used as a measure of democracy, is 
adopted. Here, the data of FH liberal democracy, which are taken from the Norris 
shared dataset (2009), are created by combining and standardizing Freedom House’s 
political rights and civil liberties scales to 100 points. According to Freedom House’ 
definition, by citing from what is quoted in Barro (1999, p. 4-6), “Political rights are 
rights to participate meaningfully in the political process. In a democracy this means 
the  right  of  all  adults  to  vote  and  compete  for  public  office,  and  for  elected 
representatives to have  a decisive vote on public policies” (Gastil 1986-87, p. 7). 
Regarding  civil  liberties,  “(they)  are  rights  to  free  expression,  to  organize  or 
demonstrate, as well as rights to a degree of autonomy such as is provided by freedom 
of religion, education, travel, and other personal rights” (Gastil 1986-87, p. 7). 
 
The main explanatory variables are as follows. 
1.  Quality of economic institutions 
Regarding  the  relationship  between  economic  institutions  and 
prosperity, it is widely believed that the security of economic activity and 
property  is  the  key  to  economic  development.  This  belief  receives 
considerable  support  from  a  vast  literature.  (For  details,  see  literature 
reviews  of  Acemoglu  et  al  (2005)  and  Weimer  (1997)).  Defined  by 
Acemoglu et al (2005, p.11) “good economic institutions” are those that 
“provide  security  of  property  rights  and  relatively  equal  access  to 
economic  resources  to  a  broad  cross-section  of  society.”  Thus,  as  a 
measure for quality of economic institutions, the economic freedom index 
provided  by  the  Fraser  Institute  since  1972  onwards  is  employed. 
According to the QOG Institution at University of Gothenburg,  
The (economic freedom) index comprises 21 components designed 
to  identify  the  consistency  of  institutional  arrangements  and 
policies  with  economic  freedom  in  five  major  areas:  size  of 
government, legal structure and security of property rights, access 
to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of 
credit, labor and business.  
In  addition  to  the  economic  freedom  index  by  the  Fraser  Institute,  other 
measures,  such  as  risk  of  expropriation  and  repudiation  risk  provided  in 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the Political Risk Group (PRS),  
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which  has  been  prevalently  used  as  a  measure  of  quality  of  economic 
institutions, will also be used.  
 
2.  Dummy  variable  for  countries  which  had  been  colonized  by  other 
countries from other continents  
By  following  the  definition  of  colonialism  provided  by  the  QOG 
Institute  at  University  of  Gothenburg,  a  country  is  coded  1  if  it  was 
colonized  by  “Western  overseas”  colonialism
7.  In  this  respect,  I  argue, 
countries which had been colonized by the USSR after the World War II 
are  coded  zero  because  it  seems  to  be  obvious  that  the  USSR’s 
colonization era represents mainly the political ideology, and did not have 
an opportunity to be resource takers. Moreover, Australia, New Zealand, 
Israel, the U.S.A. and Canada are coded zero as well as these countries are 
different from other colonized countries in that the people from colonizing 
countries also settled in these colonized countries and remain the majority 
of  population.  In  addition,  because  countries  in  the  same  region  are 
regarded  as  having  relatively  equal  power  as  well  as  conflicts  between 
neighboring states occur in general, countries which had been colonized by 
their neighbor  are  coded as zero.  In other words, only countries which 
were  mainly  colonized  for  resource-taking  purposes  by  the  superpower 
countries in the respective time are coded 1. Note that only a country that 
has been colonized since 1700 is coded. In sum, the categories of colonizer 
consist  of  Dutch,  Spanish,  Italian,  US,  British,  French,  Portuguese, 
Belgian, British-French and Australian.  
 
 
In addition to these main explanatory variables, I include as well the following 
control variables which are often used in standard growth model. 
1.  Urbanization 
On  the  topic  of  urbanization,  we  might  think  that  close  spatial 
proximity  involves  pecuniary  externalities  -  reduces  the  costs  of 
                                                 
7 According to the QOG Institute at University of Gothenburg, “only Western colonizers (e.g. 
excluding Japanese colonialism), and only countries located in the non-Western hemisphere "overseas" 
(e.g. excluding Ireland & Malta), are coded 1.”  
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intermediate  and  final  goods  trade.  However,  the  empirical  work  on 
economic development as the result of urbanization is still inconclusive. 
For  example,  Gallup  et  al  (1999)  suggest  that  urbanization  may  cause 
economic growth, rather than just emerge as part of the growth process. 
However,  recently  there  is  also  evidence  suggesting  that  urbanization 
doesn't  cause  growth  per  se.  Henderson  (2003)  finds  no  econometric 
evidence  linking  the  extent  of  urbanization  to  either  economic  or 
productivity growth or levels. 
2.  Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign  direct  investment  is  expected  to  boost  economic  growth  in 
developing  countries  because  technology  transfers  and  endogenous 
spillovers accompany foreign investment. However, the sign of this is still 
unclear on empirical grounds. (For a survey of the literature, see Moran et 
al (2005).  
3.  Education 
As  one  indicator  for  human  capital,  education  is  often  expected  to 
boost economic development. Due to the fact that the dataset of average 
years of schooling in the population aged 25 and above provided by Barro 
and Lee (2001) has been prevalently used in comparative research, it is 
adopted as an indicator measuring levels of education in this study. 
4.  GDP per capita 
The well-known catch-up hypothesis that poor economies tend to grow 
faster per capita than rich ones and tend thereby to catch up to the rich 
ones is well-established in the literature.  Thus, initial GDP per capita is 
also controlled for. 
5.  Investment 
Here,  Gross  capital  formation  (%  of  GDP)  provided  by  The  World 
Bank (WDI online database) is used as a measure for investment. 
 
 Table 5 presents the means, standard deviations, and numbers of observations 
for all variables. The variables and their sources are described in more detail in Table 
A1 of Appendix. The data includes all sovereign states from 1960 to 2004. The unit of 
observation is the average value of a given variable in the 5-year periods 1960–65, 
1965–70,  etc.  As  can  readily  be  seen  from  Table  5,  the  number  of  observations  
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available differs across the variables leading to different sized samples for the models 
tested.  
 
Table 5: Means and standard deviation of all variables 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
       
Growth  1207  1.71  4.06 
Economic Freedom  678  5.78  1.25 
Demo (polity)  1156  -0.32  7.39 
Urban  1117  45.74  24.90 
FDI  826  2.09  3.88 
Education  862  4.64  2.91 
Demo (Freedom House)  984  56.97  28.74 
investment  1078  22.30  8.75 
Risk of repudiation  360  6.16  2.20 
Risk of expropriation  360  6.73  2.16 
GDP per capita  1285  6585.49  7391.57 
 
 
4. Regression Results 
 
The basic regression results, when all countries are included are presented in 
columns (1) and (3) of Table 6. For the first two columns, as a measure of democracy 
the  Polity  score  is  employed,  while  the  index  of  liberal  democracy  provided  by 
Freedom House (FH) is used in the remaining.  
In columns (1) and (3), economic freedom and democracy enter the model 
together with their interaction term. The correlation between democracy and growth is 
strongly positive in both columns. Regarding the variable economic freedom, columns 
(1) and (3) suggests that quality of economic institutions do matter for growth as 
expected. The interaction term has a significant negative sign which is reasonable. 
That is, the importance of economic freedom as a predictor decreases when a regime 
has a higher polity score. Also, the importance of polity score as a predictor decreases, 
when we have higher economic freedom. Thus, when a country has higher economic 
freedom or higher polity (FH) scores, it seems that there should be a minor effect of 
each  on  growth.  Another  main  variable  of  interest,  a  dummy  for  colonization,  is 
negatively correlated with the growth. Its significance does not disappear even when a 
dummy variable for being an African country is included in the model. Columns (2) 
and (4) show the regression outputs when all other variables are also being controlled.  
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All  variables  which  are  significant  in  the  previous  equation  do  not  lose  their 
significances. Concerning our control variables, only FDI, education and GDP per 
capita  have  the  predicted  significant  effects  on  growth.  That  is  education,  as  an 
indicator for human capital, has the positive impact on growth. The negative relation 
between  the  growth  rate  and  level  of  per  capita  output  confirms  the  catch-up 
hypothesis that poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones. 
By using different measures for the quality of economic institutions mentioned 
in the previous section, the regression results also give the same outcomes as in Table 
6. These regression results can be found in Table 7. Proxied by risk of expropriation 
and repudiation risk, better quality of economic institutions leads to higher economic 
growth. However, the effect of initial GDP per capita is rather weak here despite it 
expected sign. This might be because the indicators proxying the effectiveness of the 
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Table 6. OLS regression results including all countries 
  Dependent variable: Growth 















  (3.86)  (3.02)  (4.80)  (2.94) 
         
polity  0.350
***  0.256
*     
  (3.70)  (2.33)     
         
EF*polity  -0.0618
***  -0.0380
*     
  (-3.88)  (-1.97)     






  (-4.13)  (-2.48)  (-4.69)  (-3.00) 
         
africandummy  -0.250  0.220  -0.0164  0.302 
  (-0.66)  (0.60)  (-0.04)  (0.81) 
         
education    0.224
**    0.209
** 
    (2.64)    (2.60) 
         
invest    0.0336    0.0312 
    (1.66)    (1.56) 




**    -0.128
** 
    (-2.85)    (-3.07) 
         
FDI    0.108
*    0.0999 
    (2.01)    (1.85) 
         
urban    -0.0158    -0.0132 
    (-1.65)    (-1.47) 
         
Dem (FH)      0.102
***  0.0744
* 
      (3.89)  (2.45) 
         
FH*EF      -0.0181
***  -0.0107
* 
      (-4.19)  (-2.08) 
N  635  453  619  469 
R
2  0.108  0.154  0.117  0.154 
Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The specifications include a constant but we do not report the estimates in the table. 
All time-varying variables are lagged one period. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
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Table 7. Panel regression using different indicators evaluating quality of economic institutions 
  Dependent Variable: Growth 








Dem (polity)  0.297
*  0.298
*     
  (2.40)  (2.47)     




*    0.809
*   
  (2.08)    (2.36)   
         
Expro*polity  -0.0439
*       
  (-2.33)       
         
colony  -1.282  -1.323  -1.392  -1.321 
  (-1.68)  (-1.80)  (-1.87)  (-1.81) 
         
africandummy  -0.736  -0.576  -0.660  -0.531 
  (-1.34)  (-1.02)  (-1.20)  (-0.94) 
         
edu  0.219  0.219  0.200  0.197 
  (1.90)  (1.92)  (1.79)  (1.78) 
         
urban  -0.0153  -0.0144  -0.0124  -0.0105 
  (-1.31)  (-1.22)  (-1.07)  (-0.92) 
         
investment  0.00517  -0.00143  0.00121  -0.000634 
  (0.14)  (-0.04)  (0.03)  (-0.02) 
         
GDP per capita/1000  -0.0683  -0.0781  -0.0702  -0.0883 
  (-1.00)  (-1.09)  (-0.95)  (-1.15) 






  (2.75)  (2.83)  (2.99)  (3.05) 
         
repudiation    0.372
*    0.805
* 
    (2.45)    (2.31) 
         
Repudiation*polity    -0.0478
*     
    (-2.35)     
         
Dem (FH)      0.0694
*  0.0587 
      (2.06)  (1.93) 
         
Expro*FH      -0.00983   
      (-1.93)   
         
Repu*FH        -0.00873 
        (-1.75) 
N  236  236  241  241 
R
2  0.178  0.180  0.171  0.169 
Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The specifications include a constant but we do not report the estimates in the table. 
All time-varying variables are lagged one period. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
Note  that  higher  values  of  measure  of  quality  of  institution,  namely  risk  of  expropriation  and 
repudiation risk indicate “better” ratings, i.e. less risk.    
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Although we can see in Table 6 that democracy as a political system appears 
to be a significant determinant of economic growth, the picture looks much different 
when considering only data from lower income groups as shown in Table 8. Here, low 
income group comprises all countries which are not classified by the World Bank 
(July 2008) as high income countries
8. The result suggests that whereas quality of 
economic institutions, e.g. a well-functioned property rights system, is a significant 
determinant of economic growth in lower income nations, democracy seems to have 
no significant effect on growth at the 5 percent level in this sample
9. Again, a dummy 
for colonization is negatively related to economic growth in this group of countries. In 
this dataset, however, urbanization and education appear to be the only significant 
control variables. Unlike in Table 6 where all countries are included, initial GDP per 
capita does not play the significant role in  explaining  economic  growth in poorer 


















                                                 
8 According to the World Bank, economies are divided according to 2007 GNI per capita, calculated 
using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $935 or less; lower middle income, 
$936 - $3,705; upper middle income, $3,706 - $11,455; and high income, $11,456 or more. 
 
9 However, it is significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 8. OLS regression results excluding high-income countries classified by the 
World Bank (July 2008) 
 
  Dependent Variable: Growth 













**  0.934 
  (4.54)  (2.17)  (2.73)  (1.65) 
         
Dem (polity)  0.215  0.267     
  (1.57)  (1.66)     
         
EF*polity  -0.0366  -0.0357     
  (-1.45)  (-1.17)     
         
colony  -2.098
***  -0.961  -2.373
***  -1.018 
  (-4.38)  (-1.57)  (-4.86)  (-1.67) 
         
africandummy  -0.134  0.394  0.183  0.450 
  (-0.37)  (1.09)  (0.52)  (1.21) 
         
education    0.218
*    0.218
* 
    (2.05)    (2.04) 
         
urban    -0.0276
*    -0.0276
* 
    (-2.41)    (-2.41) 
         
invest    0.0441    0.0375 
    (1.47)    (1.28) 
         
GDP  per capita/1000    -0.0576    -0.0745 
    (-0.63)    (-0.83) 
         
fdi    0.0228    0.0116 
    (0.23)    (0.12) 
         
Dem (FH)      0.0703  0.0704 
      (1.65)  (1.47) 
         
FH*EF      -0.0109  -0.00840 
      (-1.43)  (-0.98) 
N  421  293  401  293 
R
2  0.129  0.152  0.142  0.153 
Absolute t statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The specifications include a constant but we do not report the estimates in the table. 
All time-varying variables are lagged one period. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
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Another  interesting  point  found  from  this  analysis  is that  colonization  is  a 
significant determinant of initial income. In the regression below, GDP per capita as 
of 1960 of all sovereign countries is regressed on the colonized dummy. Its coefficient 
is  negative  and  significant.  Thus,  colonization  causes  differences  in  the  GDP  per 
capita of countries, and is also a significant impediment to economic growth. It seems 
that countries which colonized others continue to do well while the colonized nations 
seemingly cannot get out from the trap of poverty 
 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     105 
                                                       F(  1,   103) =   33.66 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2803 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2998.5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 1960gdp per capita  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Colony |      -3735    644        -5.80   0.000       -5012    -2458 






. The study suggests that the real goal for development should not merely be 
one of promoting democracy, as democracy does not necessarily lead to the prosperity 
of nations, particularly, when countries comparatively started off poor. Here we might 
ask how elections could lead to prosperity when the people in general do not have the 
capacity to judge the policies offered by politicians. Citing from Mueller’s literature 
reviews (2003, p 2),  
(John Stuart) Mill feared that the participation of the uneducated and 
poor would worsen the quality of the inputs into the political process 
and thereby the quality of the policies coming out of it. Moreover, to 
achieve  high  levels  of  growth  governments  must  adopt  intelligent 
economic policies, or at least refrain from foolish ones. Thus, if high 
participation  by  low  income  and  uneducated  classes  leads  to  poor  
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government  policies  of  one  sort  or  another,  misguided  economic 
policies causing slow growth are likely to be among them. 
Besides,  it  is  important  to  note  that  each  country  has  its  own  specific  political, 
economic, cultural and historical environment that does not allow one to apply the 
positive consequences of democracy evenly. Without sufficient understanding among 
populations  about  the  ways  democracy  actually  functions,  for  example,  elections 
alone can prove to be harmful to a nation. That is because democratic elections can be 
used  as  the  way  to  legitimize  the  authoritarian  power  of  democratically-elected 
politicians.  While  authoritarian  ruling  regimes  have  always  been  criticized  in  the 
international  sphere,  democratically-elected  authoritarian  rulers  have  fewer 
constraints  to  face.  And  this  is  particularly  true  when  these  poor  nations’ 
democratically-elected authoritarian rulers have good ties with powerful authorities, 
policy makers and politicians of some Western superpower countries.  
To  see  why  democracy  might  not  foster  economic  development  of  poor 
nations,  we  must  consider  the  political  background  of  these  countries.  In  general, 
whereas in developed nations there are usually well established institutions governing 
democracy, in poorer nations these institutions are relatively new and very vulnerable 
to  political  interference.  Additionally,  because  people  generally  do  not  actively 
participate in politics, rulers have fewer constraints to confront and can implement 
whatever policy is beneficial to them.  It can be said that democratic elections have 
been used by politicians as an innovative means to gain legitimacy of the well-known 
authoritarian regime. According to the characteristics of how the democracy functions 
in less developed nations, it can be implied that democratic elections are necessary but 
not sufficient for generating the effective democracy. The majority of support from 
elections has subsequently been used to legitimate the absolute political control of 
those  wealthy  in  government.  This,  in  turn,  firmly  maintains  their  superiority  in 
economic terms. Consequently, democracy does not prove to be beneficial to these 
nations in the long run. 
The conclusion is that a consolidated democracy supporting economic growth 
is unlikely to emerge in countries where incomes are low. When a country is poor, 
people and thus political parties tend to have no political ideology. People tend to be 
myopic when they are very poor. They can easily be entertained by any fiscal or 
monetary expansionary macroeconomic policy of governments. Neither the long run 
consequences of implementing policies nor the failures of other countries from such  
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policies have received enough attention. Moreover, the authoritarian characteristics of 
the  incumbent  leader,  the  rampant  corruption  of  governments  and  other  political 
issues are ignored as long as those in office can provide them some visible benefits. 
As a result, whereas in developed nations democratic political regimes have fortified 
prosperity, in low income nations, democratic elections have largely been exploited so 
as to strengthen the economic and political power of those well off. Therefore, the 
democracy in such countries does not support long-term growth of nations.  
Next, as can be seen from the empirical analysis, because colonization could 
leave  a  tremendously  negative  impact  on  colonized  countries  long  afterward,  the 
impact of democracy on economic development of poorer nations tends to be worsen 
when  the  idea  of  exporting  democracy  of  developed  nations  are  attached  to  the 
thoughts of taking natural resources of resource-rich poor countries. That is to say that 
by only overthrowing the authoritarian regime with newly democratic rulers who have 
good ties with some of the democracy-exporting countries might not prove beneficial 
or, in fact, could be disastrous for these democracy-imported countries. In the case of 
Iraq, which is an extreme case, although it is still too early to say what the relationship 
between democracy and prosperity in this country will be, it is unclear who actually 
benefited  from  replacing  the  authoritarian  regime  with  a  new  democracy  in  this 
country. As a matter of fact, democracy is made of political institutions that need to be 
developed over time. Overnight destruction of the old with replacement of the new 
would never improve anything because people are still same, their thoughts are still 
the same; nothing is new there except the new face of ruler and the new name of the 
regime. 
In  addition,  since  this  study  repeatedly  shows  that  colonialism,  which 
represented the need to seek out resources in these colonized lands, is a major effect 
on the deprivation of prosperity in today’s world. Thus, if the goal of all major policy 
makers is to reduce poverty and make this world a better place to live for everyone, 
not  only  for  specific  countries,  the  foreign  policies  with  the  underlying  resource-
seeking  intentions  must  be  abandoned  or  should  be  criticized  harshly  by  all 
economists whose aim is to seek ‘A World Free of Poverty’. Any policies attached to 
any form of this intention will never free this world from poverty. It will, on the 
contrary, only dampen the future of this world as the Western superpowers had done 
and the effects still remain in significantly obstructing the economic development of 
the  contemporary  world.  Thus,  as  each  country  has  its  own  specific  political,  
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economic, cultural and historical environment that does not allow one to apply the 
positive consequences of democracy evenly, policy makers should be more cautious 





First of all, this study shows that countries that were comparatively poorer 
than others in the respective times, which cannot achieve prosperity or at least the 
well-established foundation leading to growth during an authoritarian era, tend to be 
worse off. The best regime for poor countries in getting out from poverty is when the 
country has a benevolent and patriotic authoritarian ruler as a leader. It would not be 
correct to only assume that all rulers are self-interested. If it is so, some  authoritarian 
nations such as Singapore, Malaysia, Swaziland and so on, would not have achieved 
remarkable results concerning economic development, as well as South Korea, Spain, 
Portugal and Taiwan would not be highly developed during an authoritarian era either. 
However, although good rulers exist, this world is still overwhelmed with mainly self-
interested persons. Thus, when an evil dictator rules the country, the country can be 
heading to severe destruction, which may take a lifetime to recover from afterwards.  
In summary, the authoritarian political system can go for the extreme case of 
either positive or negative. Democracy for the very poor seems to never be the best 
solution. Nevertheless, democracies have never caused severe damage to countries as 
much as authoritarian regimes have. As Sen put it in Democracy as Freedom, “No 
famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy,” 
Thus, the solution of democracy in terms of prosperity for the contemporary less well-
off nations seems to be in the middle between the worst authoritarianism and the best 
authoritarian  rulers.  That  is,  in  the  case  of  poor  nations,  authoritarian  regime  can 
produce either the best or the worst result. Democracy is something between these 
two.  
Note  that  this  analysis  does  not  attempt  to  say  that  a  democratic  political 
system is not the factor boosting economic  growth in a nation. Rather, this study 
suggests that the key goal for economic development, particularly for those poorer 
nations, should not be one of promoting democracy only. The important task should 
be to work on developing favorable conditions leading to economic development, i.e.,  
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efficient property rights system, which, in turn, would spawn economic success. As a 
result, higher development would autonomously activate the peoples’ demands for a 
democratic political system. When a democratic political system is finally established, 
subsequently,  such  democracy-ready  conditions  will  spawn  economic  growth  in  a 
country further as well as reinforce the solidity of a democratic regime. That is to say 
that,  in  addition  to  people’s  analytical  abilities  for  the  possible  consequences  of 
policies  offered  by  politicians,  the  sufficient  knowledge  of  people  on  how  a 
democracy really functions indeed act as a catalyst for economic development itself. 
Moreover, it is also the people who are the main actor in maintaining their democratic 
political regime. Thus, when the time is ripe coupled with the fact that the people are 
ready for it, a democratic political system would foster prosperity in these nations, as 
it  does  for  most  of  the  developed  countries  nowadays. 




Table A1. Variables and sources 
Variable name  Variable source  Variable description 
Growth  Penn World Table PWT 6.2  Growth rate of Real GDP per capita (at 2000 constant prices: Chain series) 
Urbanization  HNPStats of The World Bank  Urban population (% of total) 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)  Risk of expropriation is scales ranging from 0-10, with higher values indicating “better” ratings, i.e. less 




International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)  Repudiation of contracts is scales ranging from 0-10, with higher values indicating “better” ratings, i.e. less 
risk.  “This indicator addresses the possibility that  foreign businesses, contractors, and consultants face the 
risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down" due to 
“an income drop, budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or a change in 




Fraser Institute  The index comprises 21 components designed to identify the consistency of institutional arrangements and 
policies with economic freedom in five major areas: size of government, legal structure and security of 
property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of credit, labor and 
business 
FDI  FDI stat by UNCTAD  Foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP 
Dem (Polity)  Polity IV project 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
The operational indicator of democracy is derived from coding of the competitiveness of political 
participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief 
executive. The value +10 indicates strongly democratic and value -10 indicates strongly autocratic political 
regime 
 
Dem (FH)  Pippa Norris;  Democracy Timeseries Data 
Release 3.0, January 2009 
The Freedom House annual political rights and civil liberty scales are combined and standardized to 100 
points 
Colony  The QOG Institute, University of Gothenburg  According to the QOG, “only Western colonizers (e.g. excluding Japanese colonialism), and only countries 
located in the non-Western hemisphere "overseas" (e.g. excluding Ireland & Malta), have been coded. 
Each country that has been colonized since 1700 is coded. In cases of several colonial powers, the last one 
is counted, if it lasted  for 10  years or longer.” The categories of colonizer are the  following: Dutch, 
Spanish, Italian, US, British, French, Portuguese, Belgian, British-French and Australian. 
 
Education  Barro and Lee (2001)  Average years of schooling in the population aged 25 and above (1960-2000)  
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Investment  WDI online databases, The World Bank 
statistics 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 
GDP per capita  Penn World Table 6.2   Real GDP per capita (2000 as base year) 
Missing values are filled in by using data provided by Gledisch (Data is taken from The QOG Institute, 
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